Crisis Migration

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Humanitarian crises—situations in which there is a widespread threat to life, physical safety, health, or basic subsistence that is beyond the coping capacity of individuals and the communities in which they reside—often have significant implications for migration. Recent stark examples include the displacement of millions affected by the conflict in Syria, the exodus of malnourished individuals from famine-hit Somalia, the evacuations following Japan’s triple disaster, and the stranding of tens of thousands of migrant workers at the Libyan-Tunisian border in the weeks following the political instability in Libya. Humanitarian crises may result from acute events, such as natural and human-made hazards—earthquakes, cyclones, and nuclear accidents—and conflict, or from slow-onset processes that cause environmental damage, erode livelihoods, and, in extreme cases, lead to famine. These events and processes may be the trigger for movement, but in most cases, underlying structural factors such as poverty and poor governance comprise the context.

Between 2010 and 2012, some 700 natural disasters were registered worldwide, affecting more than 450 million people. Armed conflict or political instability in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Mali, Côte D’Ivoire, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo affected millions more. Protracted conflicts in countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan have produced secondary irregular movements, highlighting the complex and exigent issues created in situations of conflict-induced displacement. The triple disaster in Japan left 19,000 dead or missing and rendered about 400,000 people homeless. Conflict, political

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instability, and drought frequently intersect, affecting millions of people. In 2012, for example, more than 10 million were affected throughout the Sahel region. Ongoing and intense violence in countries such as Mexico, and chronic governance failures in countries such as North Korea, create silent and often hidden needs for citizens and noncitizens alike.

The movements that occur in the context of humanitarian crises are complex and diverse. People move within and across land borders on a temporary or permanent basis in a legal or irregular manner. They move on their own or with assistance from external actors. Some benefit from evacuation mechanisms, voluntary migration programs, or social and diasporic networks. Others may resort to clandestine networks, traveling by land or sea and taking enormous risks. Some people move in direct response to acute events while others migrate in anticipation of future harm. Yet still others remain in their home communities because they lack the resources or capacity to reach safety or they are barred from entering neighboring countries.

Not all those who move are citizens of the country undergoing a crisis. Among the “crisis migrants” are noncitizens who transit or reside—temporarily or habitually—in legal or irregular status. For example, in July 2013 the number of displaced people inside Syria and in neighboring countries exceeded six million. The displaced comprise Syrian citizens, Iraqi and Palestinian refugees, and migrant workers from numerous countries, many of whom face obstacles in leaving Syria including widespread violence, exit controls, and confiscated passports.

The extent to which those who move in the context of humanitarian crises (or those who should move but are trapped) can access protection is affected by where the movement falls within the continuum of voluntary and forced movement. Political will and capacity, institutional mandates, operational decisions, and geopolitical vagaries also affect access to protection. Protection in the context of crises may need to comprise access to territory, obligations on the part of states not to return persons to serious harm, and physical safeguards as well as access to humanitarian assistance and durable solutions.

In general, however, the legal, policy, and institutional frameworks for addressing displacement of people from these diverse crises are inadequate to meet the challenges ahead. The frameworks for addressing cross-border movements of crisis migrants are particularly weak in comparison to those in place for refugees—that is, those who fit the definition contained in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention). Refugees are persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Most crisis migrants do not meet the legal definition of a refugee under international or national law.

This article seeks to conceptualize crisis migration as a first step towards improving responses. The descriptive term “crisis migration” is intended to encompass the diverse forms of movements and non-movements—situations in which people become trapped—that occur in the context of humanitarian crises, while “crisis migrants” is intended to refer to all those who move or remain trapped in such contexts. The first section discusses the conceptualization of crisis migration, the second examines the characteristics of crisis migration, and the third focuses on protection gaps. The final section suggests a potential framework for rethinking protection in the context of crisis migration.

**CONCEPTUALIZING CRISIS MIGRATION**

Conceptualizing movements related to humanitarian crises presents many dilemmas for scholars and policy makers alike. In the early 1990s, Richmond put forward the continuum of “proactive” (voluntary) and “reactive” (involuntary) migration. Since then, numerous scholars have referenced this continuum, arguing that the categories of “voluntary” and “involuntary” are unsatisfactory and may be misleading. According to Van Hear, few migrations are wholly in one category or the other. Almost all migration involves a degree of compulsion, just as almost all migration involves choices. Economic migrants make choices, but they do so within constraints and may have few alternatives to migration. Equally, forced migrants are compelled to move, but they also make choices, albeit within a limited range of possibilities, particularly as to where they will move. Even in the direst circumstances, there is still an element of choice, since some may choose to stay and risk their lives rather than leave their homes. Unfortunately, too often those who remain behind have no choice in the matter. Poverty, disability, or other factors impede their ability to get out of harm’s way.

Governments, academics, and institutional and civil society actors have already recognized the existence of legal, institutional, and implementation gaps for protecting those who move across national borders due to environmental and climate change. Questions remain as to whether there are benefits of isolating and privileging these factors as a cause of movement, particularly in light of the abundance of literature explaining the diversity of factors influencing individual and household movement-related decisions. Empirical evidence does not show climate or environmental change as the sole cause of movement. Rather, most...
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research suggests that climate and environmental change related impacts have a multiplier effect on other factors that influence movement decisions. In some cases, environmental change related impacts may be the trigger for movement, but not necessarily the cause. To view them in such a manner risks oversimplifying the context in which they are embedded.

This narrower focus on environmental and climate change also assumes that frameworks for addressing forced movement in other similar contexts are adequate, or ignores this dimension altogether. Should people displaced by disasters that are more numerous or intense because of climate change deserve greater international attention than people displaced by crises stemming from other forces? Those who lose their homes or fear for their lives, safety, or health because of earthquakes, nuclear accidents or persistent gang violence may have very similar needs to those displaced by floods and storm surges. The question, then, is whether responses should privilege certain triggers over others.

Examining movement in the context of humanitarian crises provides scope to encompass the full complement of acute- and slow-onset events and processes, and thereby broadens the analytical focus. It offers a lens through which to examine the commonalities and differences in movement across diverse crises; the commonalities and differences in associated protection and assistance needs of those who move and those who remain trapped; and the potential and shortcomings of existing legal, policy, and institutional frameworks in addressing gaps. Movement in the context of diverse, acute, and slow-onset events and processes is not new; it is a rational adaptation mechanism that people have used throughout history to manage risks to life, safety, health, and subsistence. Our hope is that the humanitarian crises lens will provide the insight necessary to determine how the existing system for protecting forced migrants should be adapted, particularized, or further developed to accommodate the array of contemporary crisis migrants.

**Characteristics of Crisis Migration**

In charting the evolution of normative and operational responses to movement in the context of humanitarian crises, this section describes the dimensions of causality, geography, temporality, and vulnerability.

**Causality**

Causality has been of paramount concern in framing responses to movement
since the World Wars. This dimension alone has become increasingly nebulous with the convergence of factors such as drought and conflict or the interplay of drivers and motivations that hinder a straightforward assessment of causation in many cases. Emerging global trends such as widespread violence involving nonstate actors, resource scarcity, and urbanization have also raised questions over the nature of migration.

Events that have the potential to trigger acute crises and induce displacement include: extreme natural hazards such as severe tropical storms (Hurricanes Mitch and Stan in Central America, Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar, and Hurricane Katrina in the United States); tsunamis (e.g., Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Somalia in 2004 and Japan in 2011); flooding (e.g., Pakistan and Colombia in 2010); and earthquakes (e.g., Haiti in 2010). Generally, the hazard alone does not trigger the crisis: a lack of national and local governance, lack of emergency preparedness (such as adequate building codes), high levels of poverty, and weaknesses in local and national capacity combine to precipitate—and at times perpetuate—humanitarian crises. For example, in 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti killed about 200,000 and displaced more than two million, but a few months later a much more severe earthquake in Chile (8.8 magnitude) led to about 523 deaths. Economics and politics made much of the difference: Chile, for example, had enacted building codes that saved lives. While very wealthy countries are not immune, as witnessed during Hurricane Katrina in the United States, stable and more economically advanced countries generally have greater capacity to assist affected populations.

Hazards can also be human-made, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological accidents and attacks; accidental or deliberate setting of fires; and similar situations that make large areas uninhabitable. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1986, for example, resulted in the evacuation of more than 100,000 people within days. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan led to nuclear power plants losing their capacity to cool reactors, forcing the evacuation of thousands.

Political instability and violence can also trigger acute crises, as seen in North Africa and the Middle East from the outset of the Arab uprisings in December 2010 to the present. Violence following contested elections in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 are other examples. Each
of these situations has generated large-scale displacement. Communal violence that does not rise to the level of armed conflict, but displaces large numbers, has occurred in and from Uganda, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. The violence can occur among clans, ethnic groups, economic competitors, religious groups, or pastoralists claiming the same land for their livestock. Gang and cartel violence is increasingly a factor in movements from and within Central America and Mexico, affecting both citizens and those transiting through Mexico.

Slow-onset crises arise in a number of different contexts. Prolonged droughts are a principal trigger and a principal reason that millions who rely on subsistence agriculture and pastoralist activities migrate. Recurrent droughts undermine livelihoods when crops fail and livestock are sold or die because of inadequate rain and depletion of other water sources. When markets do not allow redistribution of food to drought-affected populations, migration becomes one of the primary ways to cope with losses caused by the environmental change. In worst-case examples, when drought intersects with conflict or other political factors to preclude migration and/or food distribution in communities of origin, famine may be imminent.

Acute events seemingly lead to forced migration, emergency evacuations, and large-scale internal and cross-border displacements, which occur because conditions in home countries or communities require people to leave their homes or otherwise face immediate threats to their safety and well-being. By contrast, movements from processes that slowly erode livelihoods, such as persistent drought, may generate anticipatory movements, which often are perceived as voluntary migration. Yet these slow processes may eventually lead to conditions that force people to relocate, as may well be the case in small Pacific island states and elsewhere experiencing rising sea levels that threaten lives and livelihoods. Similarly, persistent drought, particularly when combined with conflict and poor governance, may leave those who hope to survive with few alternatives to migration. The 2011 mass displacement within and from Somalia is a case in point.

**Geography**

Geography constitutes another dimension in considering responses. Throughout the Cold War the principal focus of the international community was protecting those who were displaced across international borders. Many of those treated as refugees had fled Communist countries or had been displaced by superpower proxy conflicts. The end of the Cold War and subsequent interventions increased the visibility of persons forcibly uprooted within country borders because of
armed conflict, internal strife, and systematic violations of human rights. At present, internal displacement exceeds cross-border refugee movements.\textsuperscript{21} The vast majority of cross-border displacement occurs in neighboring countries, most of which have limited financial resources. Jordan and Lebanon—countries beleaguered by regional instability, limited natural resources, and civil war in the case of Lebanon—continue to host millions fleeing from Syria. At the time of writing, refugees from Syria comprised around 20 percent of the population in Lebanon and, according to the Jordanian government, Syrians could make up 40 percent of Jordan’s population by mid-2014.\textsuperscript{22} Since many conflicts have a regional element, internal and international displacement may well lead migrants into insecure environments, which can then lead to secondary movements to other countries to escape violence. With the conflict in Syria increasingly spilling across the Lebanese border and tensions between Hezbollah and Israel mounting in southern Lebanon, there is also a real danger that both refugees and host communities may find themselves caught up in violence with nowhere to go. Most movements triggered by environmental impacts also tend to be internal or across borders into neighboring countries. Such migration can pose challenges to the host communities and countries as the receiving parties will likely have few resources and may lack the necessary legal structures or institutional capacity to respond to the needs of the crisis migrants. Geographical proximity may also mean that destination areas face some of the same environmental challenges as areas of migration origin, such as drought and desertification, and therefore may offer little respite. In worst-case examples, movement into these areas may intensify competition and conflict over scarce resources. Examples are the recurrent outbreaks of violence between refugees and host communities near the Kakuma camp in Kenya and simmering tensions between increasing numbers of pastoralist from Darfur and local communities in eastern Chad due to rivalry over food and water for themselves and their livestock.

\textit{Temporality}

The temporal dimension is also relevant. The first stage occurs pre-crisis and consists of actions to avert or mitigate a crisis and help individuals adapt to the factors that may force them to move. These actions range from violence prevention to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. The second stage, if the crisis cannot be prevented, is the movement itself. In the case of acute crises, this often takes the form of large-scale displacement, generally under chaotic circumstances. In the case of slow-onset crises, migration in anticipation
of worsening conditions may be more common. Both forms of movement can generate substantial risks, particularly if conditions are chaotic or, as in the case of many boat departures and irregular border crossings, inherently dangerous.

Not everyone who should move during this stage is able and willing to do so. Populations that are especially vulnerable such as children, the elderly, the disabled, and the extremely poor may need assistance in evacuating or relocating during acute crises. When and to where people should migrate, however, may be uncertain, particularly in slow-onset situations. Similarly, communities that face recurrent acute events such as cyclones and floods may successfully remain in place in some years but be forced to leave in others.

For many persons, protracted displacement can frequently become the reality. Drought and conflict in Somalia, the earthquake in Haiti, and communal violence in Iraq have resulted in long periods during which the displaced remain in camps or urban environments, unable to return home or fully integrate in their new surroundings. For those who are fortunate, the final stage of the life cycle of a crisis generally involves returning to their home communities or integrating into new locations in their home or neighboring countries. In extreme situations brought on by environmental factors, such as in Montserrat after the devastating volcanic eruption and increasingly in much of the Carteret Islands, an entire country or community may become uninhabitable. In these situations permanent relocation could prove to be the only alternative.

**Vulnerability**

A final dimension pertinent to framing responses relates to the needs of the affected populations: the level of vulnerability and its corollary, resilience. To a large degree, vulnerability is a measure of demographic and socioeconomic factors. Some groups are inherently vulnerable during humanitarian crises even if they can also call upon reserves of resilience: young children, the elderly, and the disabled, to name a few. When displaced, these groups require particular attention to ensure that their special needs for assistance and protection are addressed. Others may become vulnerable because they lose their social or economic support systems in periods of crisis and displacement. Examples of these include female heads of household, the extremely poor, and victims of trafficking.

Vulnerability and opportunities for resilience may differ depending on when in the life cycle of a crisis people move. People exhaust their ability to cope with slow-onset processes such as drought at different rates depending on their social and financial capital. At the height of certain crises, everyone may be
vulnerable because of the chaos that results. In protracted situations of displacement, a semblance of normality may set in for some, but new pressures arise for others. For example, adolescents may be at serious risk of recruitment into gangs, military operations, or sex work if education and means of generating an income are unavailable to them.

Similarly, not all are able to benefit equally when solutions for the displaced are promoted. Many will continue to have pressing needs even after return is feasible and desirable for others. In Pakistan, those displaced by floods generally returned to their homes within one year. However, the so-called end of displacement did not equate to a cessation of needs. Rather, inadequate temporary shelters, negligible housing, land and property rights, and restrictive government policies left a large number of people with little choice but to return to destroyed homes, many of which were unfit for habitation. Delayed interventions from development actors in formulating early recovery programs and a dearth of appropriate income generation opportunities increased vulnerability after their return. Many sub-Saharan African migrants escaping conflict in Libya returned to their countries of origin only to find limited employment opportunities and few prospects for social integration after years spent in Libya.

Vulnerability may also vary depending on the location of the displaced. Both camps and urban environments pose challenges for those affected by crises. Camps are often violent places that offer little in the way of economic opportunities. On the positive side, however, they facilitate relatively efficient delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations. Crisis migrants in urban areas may have more freedom of movement, but they may not be eligible to work, have greater difficulties accessing assistance, and experience security problems, particularly if the host country considers them illegal residents. For example, Burmese displaced persons living in Bangkok are unable to work legally and are at constant risk of arrest and deportation.

LEGAL PROTECTION GAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF CRISIS MIGRATION

Migration and displacement within and across borders is a matter of state sovereignty. This is not absolute, however. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides clear guidance in Article 13 that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” Only since 1998, however, have international norms been promulgated regarding the rights of those who are forcibly displaced within their own countries.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are a nonbinding, soft-
There are no international instruments that specifically address international migration stemming from humanitarian crises except those pertaining to refugees.

Among countries that have ratified the convention, adherence to the norms articulated therein continues to pose a problem. Some governments have been slow to implement the policies and laws that they have adopted into their national legal frameworks, while most have failed to do so at all. This is especially the case when there is no convergence between domestic political interests and legislation on internally displaced persons. Moreover, some countries that have well-established domestic laws regarding conflict displacement, such as Colombia, do not have similar provisions regarding natural disasters.

There are no international instruments that specifically address international migration stemming from humanitarian crises except those pertaining to refugees. Persecution and torture are the main bases upon which persons who cross borders are able to access surrogate protection under international law. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, in essence, substitute the protection of the international community in the form of a host government for that of an unable or unwilling sovereign. State parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention must adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, a commitment against the forcible return of a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of those traits outlined in the definition of a refugee. That said, states need not provide asylum or admit refugees for permanent resettlement; states relocate refugees to safe third countries that are willing to accept them. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention,
which permits limited exceptions to non-refoulement, the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment places an absolute prohibition against forcible return to a state where there are substantial grounds to believe an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

Since its founding, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has responded to the plight of persons displaced by conflict as well as by persecution. In most parts of the world, UNHCR and countries of asylum do not attempt to determine whom among the vast number of persons who flee conflict also faces a well-founded fear of persecution; thus, they treat those escaping conflict as prima facie refugees. The situation of Syrian refugees today is a case in point.

Mechanisms to address crisis migration lag behind in the development of new law. Recent attention has focused on acute natural hazards and slow-onset environmental processes. No international agreement has been reached, however, as to the appropriate frameworks for addressing such movements, especially those that are cross-border. Even less attention has been paid to other triggers of displacement such as nuclear disasters, gang and cartel violence, or electoral and communal violence.

Rethinking Protection in the Context of Crisis Migration

The current system of protection for individuals satisfying the legal definition of a refugee implicitly accepts the importance of the state apparatus in respecting and protecting the rights of its citizens. It substitutes surrogate international protection for refugees who are unwilling or unable to accept the protection of their own country because of their well-founded fear of persecution. Building on this premise, we divide crisis migrants into three categories according to their relationship with their own governments, in order to determine if international protection is needed because of an absence of state protection.

The first category consists of individuals whose governments are willing and able to provide protection. Those affected by acute hazards in wealthy, democratic countries generally fall into this category. Some poorer and more authoritarian governments also have good records in protecting and assisting those affected by acute events and slow-onset processes. Generally, displacements in these contexts are internal, not international, since the crisis migrants are able to find assistance from their own governments and have few reasons to cross an international border. In these cases, the international community has a
limited role, although other governments and international organizations may offer assistance—for example, in the form of search and rescue teams, financial aid for rebuilding homes, health professionals, and other experts in disaster relief. There is generally no need in these situations for surrogate protection from the international community.

The second category consists of individuals in situations in which governments are willing but unable to provide protection. Certainly, poor countries that do not have the financial capacity to provide assistance fall into this category. These countries would like to protect their citizens from harm, but do not have the capacity or resources to do so. If the affected population moves within the country of origin to find safety, a government may well attempt to fulfill its protection responsibilities by calling upon the international community to assist. In these situations, the international community has an important role to play in ensuring that it buttresses the willing state’s ability to provide protection by offering financial and other types of aid. This group of countries may especially need aid when trying to recover from current crises and reduce risk from future emergencies.

The third category is for situations in which governments are unwilling to provide protection to their citizens or noncitizens on their territory. In some cases, the government has the capacity to provide protection, but is unwilling to offer it to some or all of those affected. For example, the government may choose not to spend its resources on political opponents or ethnic and religious minority groups. Alternatively, it may limit assistance and protection to citizens and not address the needs of non-citizens, some of whom may be illegally in the country. In other situations, the government is both unwilling and unable to protect its citizens. Failed states would fit into this category because they have neither the willingness nor the ability to protect those living on their territory. These situations produce extremely high levels of vulnerability for those who do not receive the protection of the state and thus international protection may be essential regardless of the cause, geography, or phase of displacement.

The third category presents challenges for the international community, particularly in cases of internal displacement. In such cases, if state sovereignty or security conditions preclude direct access, the international community can still play an important role as an advocate for unprotected persons, up to and including encouraging the UN Security Council to intervene.

In cases where large numbers move across borders because of the unwillingness of their own government to provide protection, the host country has principal responsibility for determining what—if any—form of protection to
Just as refugees are at risk of serious harm if returned to their home countries, crisis migrants from countries experiencing humanitarian crises may face life-threatening situations.

Conclusion

Crises with migration implications are unlikely to disappear in the future. In fact, the number and frequency of these crises may increase substantially in the years ahead. Climate change is expected to generate substantial internal and international displacement from increases in the intensity and frequency of natural hazards, rising sea levels, persistent drought and desertification, and potentially new conflicts over scarce resources. The process of political change taking hold in many parts of the world can also have destabilizing repercussions, causing new movements of people. All of these trends mean that governments will likely face recurrent crises that spark migration and accompanying humanitarian needs. Although much of this crisis migration will be within countries facing emergencies, movements across borders are likely as well.

The absence of effective policy tools is troubling because these crises have implications well beyond immigration, touching on basic humanitarian and human rights interests. Just as refugees are at risk of harm if returned to their home countries, migrants from countries experiencing humanitarian crises may face life-threatening situations. They may also have immediate need for humanitarian assistance, including shelter, health care, food, and other basic items. Ultimately, the most pressing challenge in addressing crisis migration may be determining who should benefit from international protection. In this context, analyzing the willingness and capacity of states to provide protection to those on their territory and the associated role and obligation of the international community is
an essential starting point. Rethinking approaches to crisis migration through this lens—that is, the absence of state protection rather than the specificity of causes—could go some way toward addressing current shortcomings in legal frameworks, delineating the appropriate roles of various actors in assisting and protecting crisis migrants, and guiding timely, measured, and effective responses to the migration ramifications of future humanitarian crises.

Notes

1. For information on the Institute for the Study of International Migration’s Crisis Migration project, see: “Crisis Migration,” Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.
4. “Crisis in the Sahel Region,” World Food Program.
5. People who become trapped in situ are also of concern.
6. As of July 2013, there are 1.8 million persons of concern to UNHCR and an estimated 4.25 million internally displaced persons inside Syria. For the latest statistics, see: UNHCR’s Syria Regional Response Portal and IDMC’s country page on Syria.
8. It is also affected by where movement is perceived to fall. In some contexts, perception may be as important as reality.
10. Ibid., Article 1A(2).
13. Ibid.
20. Martin, “Rethinking the International Refugee.”
30. Thomas, “Flooding in Pakistan and Colombia.”
31. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “everyone has the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country.” The Declaration does not require any other country besides the home country to admit people who exercise their right to leave. Similarly, Article 14 states “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,” but there is no corresponding obligation on the part of states to offer asylum.
32. As of August 2012 there were 147 signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, or both.
33. UNHCR, *Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement*.
35. Efforts have been made in Africa and Latin America to enshrine recognition of conflict refugees in international law. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa protects those who, “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” In Latin America, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees similarly expanded the definition of protected refugees but is not a formal treaty.
36. China’s response to the earthquake in Sichuan province is an example.